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ABSTRACT 
Malwares are big threat to digital world and evolving with high 
complexity. It can penetrate networks, steal confidential 
information from computers, bring down servers and can 
cripple infrastructures etc. To combat the threat/attacks from 
the malwares, anti- malwares have been developed. The 
existing anti-malwares are mostly based on the assumption 
that the malware structure does not changes appreciably.  But 
the recent advancement in second generation malwares can 
create variants and hence posed a challenge to anti-malwares 
developers.  To combat the threat/attacks from the second 
generation malwares with low false alarm we present our 
survey on malwares and its detection techniques.   
General Terms 
Information security and Malware analysis. 
Keywords 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A malware is a malicious software/program/code which enters 
system without user authorization and takes undesirable 
actions. The term is too often used interchangeably with virus, 
even though the two are not the same. Malware is actually a 
condensed, conjoined term used to refer viruses, worms, 
trojan horses, spyware, adware, rootkits, botnets etc. In today’s 
computing world malwares are a big threat and are continuously 
growing with high complexity. The reason behind the increase 
in threat from malware is the wide spread use of World Wide 
Web. An estimate shows that the web based attack increased 
36% with over 4,500 new attacks each day, 
annoying/disrupting the victim in terms of confidentiality, 
integrity, availability of the victim’s data etc. [1]. 
In 2011, Symantec Internet Security reported that ∼ 403 
million new variants of malware were created, a 41% 
increase from 2010 [1].  State sponsored highly skilled 
hackers are developing customized malwares to disrupt 
industries and for military espionage [2]. Such attacks can 
alter the operation of industrial systems or disrupt power 
plants etc. [3] The intrusion into Google’s systems 
demonstrates how well-organized attacks are designed to 
maintain long-term access of an organizations network [4]. 
Success of windows based malware has inspired attackers to 
develop cross-platform variants to maximize the damages. 
Therefore Linux OS are no more immune to the malware 
attacks. Over the years Linux features are more or less same, 
hence some rootkits that have been used decade back are still 
being used for the attacks, e.g. the Adore root kit, trojanized 
system binaries, SSH servers etc. [5]. 
Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), in particular mobile 
phones, which are integral part of our lifestyle, are also 
vulnerable to malware attacks.  F-secure, documented a 
recent increase in malware attacks against mobile devices 
based on Android and Apple iOS [6]. The McAfee threat 
report reveals a significant increase in mobile malwares 
from 2004 to 2012, and claimed more than 8,000 mobile 
malwares are collected in their databases [7]. According to 
Symantec Internet Security, out of 5,291 new vulnerabilities 
that have been discovered in 2012, 415 of them are on 
mobile operating systems [1]. 
Since the first virus created in 1970 [8], there is a strong 
contest between the attackers and the defenders. To defend the 
malware attacks, anti-malware groups are developing new 
techniques. On the other hand, malware developers are 
adopting new tactics/methods to avoid the malwares 
detectors. Initially the tools and techniques of malware 
analysis were in the domain of anti-malware vendors. 
However, the use of malware for espionage, sophisticated 
cyber-attacks and other crimes has motivated academicians 
and digital investigators to develop advanced methods to 
combat the threats/attacks from it. 
There are many malware detection systems viz.  Signature 
based detection, code emulation, heuristic code analysis and 
machine learning. Some malwares are easy to detect and 
can be removed from the system by commonly used 
signature based antivirus software. But the signature based 
technique can’t detect new or previously unknown variant of 
malwares. This method of detection worked well until the 
malware group started developing the polymorphic and 
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metamorphic malwares. Knowing the limitation of signature 
based detection technique, malware developers are creating 
variations in malwares by employing a variety of code 
obfuscation methods viz. reordering instructions, renaming 
registers, substituting sets of equivalent instructions and 
inserting junk snippets. Rest of the paper is organized as 
follows: Section 2 describes the types of Malwares. Section 3 
discusses the detection techniques of malwares. Finally in 
section 4 we discuss the future direction of anti-malwares 
development.  
2. TYPES OF MALWARES 
Malwares are basically classified as first generation and 
second generation.  In first generation, structure of the 
malwares does not change.  But in second generation, the 
internal structure of malwares change in every variant while 
the actions are maintained same.  On the basis of how 
variances are created in malware, second generation malwares 
are further classified as Encrypted, Oligomorphic, 
Polymorphic and Metamorphic Malwares.  
2.1 Encrypted Malwares 
Encryption was the first concealment techniques used for 
creating the 2nd generation malwares [9]. It consists of two 
parts; the encrypted body and a decryption code [10]. 
Usually the body is XORed with a key to make it difficult to 
detect. For each infection, encrypted malware makes the body 
unique by using different key to hide the signature. However, 
the decryption routine remain same, hence it can be detected 
by analyzing the decryptor. In this method when the malware 
code executes; first the decryption part is executed to decrypt 
the body of the malware and then the code is executed for the 
action. The first encrypted malware was CASCADE [11]. 
Later on using the CASCADE technique Win95/Mad and 
Win95/Zombie were created. The main motivation to use the 
encryption malware is to avoid static code analysis, delay the 
process of inspection, prevent tampering and avoid detection 
[12]. 
2.2 Oligomorphic Malware 
The short comings of the encrypted malware led to the 
development of different concealment techniques. In 
Oligomorphic malwares decryptors are mutated from one 
variant to other. Initially this type of malware was capable of 
changing the decryptor slightly [9].  The simple method to 
create Oligomorphic malwares is to provide a set of different 
decryptors rather than one. At most this malware can generate 
few hundred different decryptors, e.g. Win95/Memorial had 
the ability to build 96 different decryptor patterns [13]. For 
its detection, signature based techniques can be applied by 
making the signature of all the decryptors. However, in general 
to detect Oligomorphic malwares, signature based techniques 
are not a good approach [10]. 
2.3 Polymorphic Malwares 
In Polymorphic malwares, millions of decryptors can be 
generated by changing instructions in the next variant of the 
malware to avoid signature based detection [12]. It also 
consists of two parts; the first part is the code decryptor to 
decrypt the second part (body). During the execution of 
malware, mutation engine creates a new decryptor which is 
joined with the encrypted malware body to construct a new 
variant of malware [14]. Polymorphic malwares are created 
by using the obfuscation techniques (dead-code insertion, 
register reassignment, subroutine reordering, instruction 
substitution, code transposition/integration etc.) [9]. The 
first known polymorphic malware was 1260, written by 
Mark Washburn in 1990 [10]. Although, a large number of 
variants of decryptors can be created, but still signature 
scanning technique can be used to detect the malwares by 
identifying the original program with emulation technique 
[9]. 
2.4 Metamorphic Malwares 
Metamorphic malwares are body-polymorphic [10], i.e.  
Instead of generating new decryptor, a new instance (body) is 
created without changing its actions.  Similar to polymorphic 
malware, obfuscation techniques can be used to create new 
instances. It is believed that in future it will harm both 
computers and PDAs in large scale as it is almost 
impossible to detect by signature based techniques. Creating 
a true metamorphic malware without arbitrarily increasing the 
size is a challenging task. It has been shown that there are 
only few malwares exhibit true metamorphic behavior [15], 
e.g. Phalcon/Skism Mass-Produced Code Generator, Second 
Generation virus generator, Mass Code Generator and Virus 
Creation Lab for Win32 were claimed to be metamorphic but 
were not. The first metamorphic virus was created in 1998 
called as Win95/Regswap [16]. In 2000, Win32/Ghost virus 
was created with 3628800 different variants [16]. One of the 
strongest metamorphic malware W32/NGVCK was created in 
2001 with the help of Next Generation Virus Creation Kit 
(NGVCK). 
3. DETECTION TECHNIQUES 
To combat the threat/attacks from the malwares, softwares 
(anti-malware) are developed, which are mostly based on the 
assumption that the malware structure does not change 
appreciably. But the variant of 2nd generation malwares are 
very much different to each other, hence threat/attacks from 
such malwares to Computers and PDAs are increasing day by 
day. Therefore, there is a need that both academia and anti-
malwares developers should continually work to prevent 
damage from the evolution of malwares.  This section discus 
the various techniques used for the detection of malwares. 
3.1 Signature based detection 
Signature detection is the simplest and an effective way of 
detecting known malwares [17]. Once the malware is 
identified, unique sequences of bytes are extracted from it, 
which represents the sig- nature of the malware. This 
signatures are selected long enough to characterize a specific 
malware with respect to any other benign program, e.g. 
Worm/klez.E and Worm/MyParty.Ao signatures are 
33be732d4000bd08104000e89eeaffff80bd08104000be7d2d40
00e849eaffff6a00e83500000064756d6d792e65786500653a5c
77696e646f77735c53795374656d33325c644c6c63616368655
c6464642e65786500ff254c404000ff25544040 and aa328cf2 
4554d90b307c407eca9a4cf02a4d5a90000332c8b26904ffffb8
40f97f370080040e1fba0e00b409cd21b8014c001f027c546869
73c363616e042568d54562e2c876b0ffbf0420444f53 
respectively [18]. This techniques scans the file in the sys- 
tem to find the defined malware signature, if found an alert of 
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the presence of malware is sent, e.g. Aho-Corasick algorithm 
scan for the exact matching, hence a slight mismatch will 
escape detection [19].  Veldamna and Wu-Manber proposed 
the use of wildcard for detecting slight variance in the 
malwares. Some metamorphic malwares could be detected 
using the wildcard method, e.g. W32/Regswap [12]. 
It is easy to use, however requirement of scanning becomes 
costly as the database of malware signature is increasing 
very fast [20]. Also, it’s a completely reactive technique, 
therefore unable to combat threats/attack from the new 
malwares until it causes damage. Gartner [21] believes that 
eventually Signature-based techniques will be replaced with 
more robust approaches, because today the signature-based 
anti-malwares have marginal value as 2nd generation 
malwares can easily escape detection. 
3.2 Heuristics based detection 
In this method there are two approaches for the detection of 
malwares. Firstly in static approach suspicious program are 
disassembled to find a matching of the known malware 
pattern, if any. If the analysis result crosses the preset 
threshold then the program is marked as infected [22]. 
Secondly in dynamic approach, code emulation techniques 
are used by simulating the processor and operating system to 
detect suspicious operations (an attempt to open other 
executable files with the intention of modifying its content, 
changing the Master Boot Record, concealing themselves 
from the operating system, etc.) on a virtual machine. 
The Heuristics method is a promising technique for the 
detection of unknown malware, in particular to detect 
encrypted malwares [20].  However, it requires entire 
virtual environment to be installed.  Also it is prone to 
false alarm [23], which may make the system more 
vulnerable by taking the real malware as another false 
alarm. Researchers augment the results of detection 
techniques and combine it with another detection technique 
to reduce the false alarm [24]. 
3.3 Machine Learning 
In recent years, malware detection with machine learning 
techniques is gaining popularity. Tom Mitchell defines 
machine learning as the study of computer algorithms that 
improve through experiments [25]. Robert Moskovitch et. 
al. proposed detection of malwares based on monitoring the 
computer behavior (features). His evaluation results suggest 
that by using classification algorithm applied on only 20 
features the mean detection accuracy exceeded 90% [26]. The 
advantage of machine learning techniques is that it will not 
only detect known malwares but also act as knowledge for 
the detection of new malware. The popular machine learning 
techniques among the researchers for the detection of 2nd 
generation malwares are Naive Bayes [27], Decision Tree [28], 
Data Mining [29], Neural Networks [28] and Hidden Markov 
Modes [15]. 
This technique may not replace the standard detection 
methods, but can act as an add-on feature. Generally, 
machine learning techniques are more computationally 
demanding then the standard anti-malware, hence it may not 
be suitable for end users.  However, it can be implemented 
at enterprise gateway level to act as a central anti-malware 
engine to supplement anti-malwares. Although, 
infrastructure requirement is costly, but it can help in 
protecting valuable enterprises data from the security threat 
and can prevent immense financial damages. 
3.4 Malware Normalization 
The malwares generated from advanced toolkits such as UPX 
and Mitsfall are difficult to detect [30].  For the detection of 
such malwares, normalization techniques can be used to 
improve the detection rate of an existing anti-malware.  In 
this technique, normalizer accepts the obfuscated version of 
malware and eliminates the obfuscation carried on the program 
and produce the normalized executable. After normalization 
the signature of the malware is extracted and compared with 
the signature of canonical form [31]. Christodorescu et. al. 
designed a malware normalizer that handles three common 
obfuscations viz. code reordering, packing, and junk insertion 
[32]. Later on Armor et.  al., [33] proposed a generalized 
malware normalizer which can store obfuscation methods in 
the form of automata structures and use them for normalizing 
the metamorphic mal- wares. Recently a general malware 
normalizer has been proposed that can store lots of obfuscation 
methods in the form of automata structures for normalizing 
metamorphic malwares, which has a detection rate up to 81% 
[33]. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
The malware creators are ahead of the anti-malware 
developer. The reason is the availability of good softwares to 
create variants of malwares [8]. So far for the detection of 
malwares; Signature matching [22], Heuristic approach [20], 
Machine learning [28] and Normalization methods [33] are 
used. There is no method available to detect zero day attack 
malwares with 100% accuracy [27]. Also, not much has been 
done to detect malwares of LINUX OS and PDAs, which are 
under the radar of malware attackers. It has been reported 
that there exists malwares which cannot be detected by any 
anti-malware [24]. Moreover it is impossible to develop a 
generic algorithm to detect all possible malwares [34]. Hence 
regular study is required to combat the threat/attacks from the 
new malwares. Therefore from time to time both academic 
community and software companies proposed methodologies 
and offer products to fight against malwares. Currently 
research groups are focusing on the detection of metamorphic 
malwares generated by NGVCK [35], Virus Construction Set 
and Genvir [8]. To detect the metamorphic malwares, 
normalization techniques can be exploited [33]. 
Malwares in PDAs are increasing at an unprecedented rate 
and it is mainly due to the ease of generating malware 
variants [7]. The recent attacks on PDAs show that there is an 
urgent need to develop robust anti-malwares, in particular for 
defense against zero-day attack [37]. The detection of 
malwares in PDAs (Android) is done primarily by permission 
leakage [38]. Min Zheng et. al., 2013 proposed a signature 
based analytic system to automatically collect, manage, 
analyze and extract android malware known as Droid 
Analytics. They used 150,368 Android applications and 
successfully determined 2,497 Android malwares from 102 
different families, with 342 of being zero-day malware 
samples from six different families. However, there are still 
open questions viz. how to detect new malware variants in 
PDAs which are always hidden in the many different third- 
party markets [39]. Also it is important to find out how one 
can identify repackaged applications from the vast ocean of 
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applications and malwares.  In order to overcome the above 
issue cloud computation may be one of the solutions. 
In addition, efficient malware detection plays an important role 
for the end users. Traditionally, malware detection techniques 
use large database installed in the system. Hence require to 
develop efficient methods for scanning the malwares. Recent 
NIST approved hash function called Secure Hash Algorithm -
3 (Keecak) may be used for efficient scanning [36]. Also one 
can use the power of general-purpose graphics processing unit 
for efficient scanning of malwares. 
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